City of Lynchburg, etc. v. John L. Suttenfield by unknown
} I ,' S( 
. 
\/ 
Record No. 2384 
In the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
at Richmond 
CITY OF LYNCHBURG, ETC., 
v. 
JOHN L. SUTTENFIELD 
FR<>:'lt TH E CORPOll.\ l'TO X \ 'Ol!RT OF T ll l•'. t'fT\' OF L\ XC'lTJll"RC: 
RULE 14. 
TI°O. NUMBER OF COPIES TO BE FILED AND DELIVERED TO 0PP0S· 
mo COUNSEL. Twenty copies of cac.h brief shall be filed with 
tl1e cler k of the court, ancl at least two copies mailed or de. 
Ii vercd to opposing counsel on or before the clay on which tho 
brief is filed. 
TI"6. SrzE AND TYPE. Briefs shall be printed in type noL less 
in size than small picn, and shall be nine inches in length 
and six inches in wicHh, so as to conform in dimensions to 
the printed recor ds. The record numhcr of the case sLall be 
printed on all br iefs. 
The foregoing is printe<l in small pica type for the informa-
tion of counsel. 
M. B. "\V" ATTS , Clerk. 
Jl ~ 
INDEX TO PETITION· 
(Record No. 2384) 
Page 
Statement of i.,acts .................. : . ............. 2'*'-5*'1 
Tl1e Question Involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5:11 
Argument-beginning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5* 
Section 290 of the Virginia Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5* 
Purposes of Section 290. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6* 
Exceptions contained in Sections 291a and 29lb. . . . . . . . 8* 
ExceiJtion in Section 291. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g:r; 
Virginia Military Code, Chapter 106 ................ 9*-11 * 
The Federal Laws Applicable ...................... 11*-12* 
Opinion of General S. T. Anse11, Acting Judge Advocate 
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,.~ 
Opinion of same authority, :30 Harvard Law Review, 712-
72~ ........................................... 18~"' 
Effect of Situation on Lynchburg ..................... 19t1., 
Conclusio11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 ,x, 
Importance of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 * 
Table of Citations 
Buntin,q v. Willis, Judge, 68 Va. 144. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6* 
C01nnwnwealth v. Roi1,sc, 163 Va. 84JL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7ii.• 
Houston v. 11!Joo·re (U.S.), 5 L. Ed. 19 ................. n~ 
U. B. v. Su,rJar, 243 Fed. 423, 252 Fed. 79; 63 L. Ed. (U. 
S.) 429 ..................................... 11 *, 15~ 
The same case on ................................... 15* 
Ex Partc, Dostal, 243 Fed. 664 ........................ 15~ 
U. S. v. Carlson, 44 Fed. (2d) 5 .............. · ......... 15* 
Baker v. State, 200 N. C. 232, 156 S. E. 917 ............. 15*'~ 
Fekete v. City of East St. Louis (Ill.), 145 N. E. 6'92; 
40 A. J,;, R,. 650. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 •». 
Louw. v. State: (Texas), 201 S. W. 986 .................. 16,x, 
E:r Parte, Dailey, 246 S. W. 91, 26 A. L. R. 138. . . . . . . . . . 16* 
IN 'l'HE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
A'r RIUHMOND. 
Record No. 2384-
CITY OiF LYNCHBURG, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
L. E. LICHlFORD, COUNCILMAN AND MAYOR OF 
SAID CITY, AND W. M. HEALD, ·C. G. PATTERSON, 
R. A. CARRINGTON, JR., AND A. P. LANKFORD, 
COUNCILMEN OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG, 
vers'll,S 
.TORN L. SUTTENFIELD. 
PETITION. 
To the Honorable Justices of the S·uprmne Coivrt of .Appeals 
of Vir.i1inia: 
Your petitioners, the City of Lynchburg, a municipal cor-
poration, L. E. Lichford, Councilman and Mayor of said 
City, and W. M. Heald, C. G. Patterson, R A. Carrington, 
tlr., and A. P. Lankford, Councilman of the said City, respect-
fully ask that a writ of error be granted them upon an order 
entered by the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg 
on October 14, 1940, in a declaratory jud!?,ment proceeding 
in which petitioners and another were defendants and John 
L . .Sutten:field was -plaintiff. 
The said order decided that the said John L. Suttenfield. 
a member of the Council of the Citv of Lvnchburg duly elected 
as such, who was an offic~r in tl1e Virginia Nationai Guard, 
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did not forfeit his office as Councilman of the City under the 
terms a1id provisions. of Section 290 of the Code of Virginia, 
when he was· inducted 1.nto the active military service 
2* of the United .States on *September 16, 1940, and thereby 
became an officer of the United States Army, under a 
resolution of Congress approved August 27, 1940, and under 
an executive order issued by the President of the United 
States on Aug·ust 31, 1940. There is filed herewith a copy 
of the record in the lower court. 
The matter here involved is one of great importance to the 
City of Lynchburg and all other cities and all other political 
supdivisions of the State, and, indeed, to the State of Vir-
ginia itself, as there may be, and probably are, other cities 
and towns and counties, and the State itself which may have 
officers who were or will 1be inducted into the military service 
of the United States under the same resolution of Congress, 
and it is important for both the ,State and its political sub-
divisions to have :finally determined whether or not the offices 
therein are rendered vacant by such induction into the mili-
tary service of the United States of certain officeholders, 
and it is important to such officers to also have the question 
determined by this 'Court. It is a case of first impression 
in Virginia, though similar questions have been passed upon 
by the Courts of other States. 
STATEMENT OF FACTiS . 
• John L . .Suttenfield served one term. of four years as Coun-
cilman of the City of.Lynchburg, said term expiring August 
31, 1940. During such term, he received an annual salary 
from the City of $500.00 payable in equal· monthly instal-
ments. At the regular election held on the first Tuesday of 
August, 1940, he was re-elected to the office of Councilman for 
a term of four years beginning September 1, 1940, and duly 
qualified as such, and took his office. For said new term 
he would receive the same a.nnual salary from the *City 
3* of Lynchburg (Rec., page 25). 
Since May, 1938, the said .J olm L. Suttenfield has held 
a commission as First Lieutenant and Chaplain in the 246th 
Coast 4rtillery Regiment of the National Guard of Virginia 
(Rec., page 3). As such officer, he lms attended the regular 
military encampments of his regiment and the regular drill~ 
of his unit, and bas received compensation therefor from the 
United States Government (Rec., pa~;e 26). 
The Congress of the United States adopted a resolution ap-
proved August 27, 1940, authorizing the President to, from 
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time to time, call into the active military service of the United 
States for a period of twelve consecutive months any and 
all units of the National Guard (Rec., page 7). Pursuant to 
this resolution, the President of the United States issued an 
executive order dated August 31, 1940, calling into the active 
military service of the United States as of September 16, 
1940, the 246th Coast .Artillery Regiment, in which the said 
Suttenfield was an officer (Rec., pages 12-14). Pursuant to 
this executive order, the Adjutant-General of Virgi-nia issued 
general orders calling all units of the 246th Coast Artillery 
to report for duty on September 16, 1940 (Rec., pag·es 14-15). 
Pursuant to this order, the said Suttenfield reported for duty 
on September 16, 1940, at the armory in Lynchburg·, and was 
inducted into the active military service of the United States 
on tl1at date. He is now with ·his unit at Fort Storey, Vir-
ginia, drawing the salary of his office from the United States 
of America.. 
On September 20, 1940, at a meeting of the Council of the 
City of Lynchburg there was presented an opinion from the 
City Attorney to the effect that when Mr. Suttenfield was in-
ducted into the active military service of the United 
4* States on September 16, *1940, his position as City Coun-
cilman was, ipso fa.cto, vacated under the provisions 
of Section 290 of the Code of Virginia. Whereupon, at said 
meeting, the Council by a vote of five to one, the said Sutten-
field not voting, adopted a resolution declaring Mr. Sutten-
field's office as Councilman vacated for the reasons above set 
forth. 1vI r. Suttenfield protested the action of the Council, 
claiming that his office as Councilman was not vacated by 
his induction into the active military service of the United 
States. as he came within certain exceptions to Section 290, 
contained in Sections 291, et seq., of the Code of Virginia. 
Following- the adoption of the foregoing resolution by the 
Council (Exhibit 4, Rec., pag-e 15), Mr . .Suttenfield withdrew 
·from the Council meeting·. Promptly thereafter, l\fr . .Sutten-
field filed his petition for a declaratory judgment in the Cor-
poration Court agab1St tl1e City of Lynchburg and its Mayor 
and remahling Councilmen, asking the Court to declare the 
provisions of Section 290 of the Code of Virginia not appli-
cable to him. To this petition, the City of Lynchburg and 
the Mayor and four Councilmen filed their answer denying; the 
rig·ht of tlie petitioner to l1olcl bis office. Edley Craighill, 
another member of the Council who had voted against tbe 
resolution of September 20. ,1940, declaring- Mr. S1ittenfield 's 
office vacant. filed a separate answer, sustaining l\fr. Sutten-
field's rig·ht to tl1e office of Councilman. An agTeecl statement 
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of facts was submitted. The case was submitted to the Court 
on the petition of Suttenfield and exhibits therewith filed, .on 
the joint answer of the petitioners here and exhibit filed 
therewith, on the separate answer of Edley Craig·hill, Coun-
cilman, and on the agreed statement of facts. The case was 
argued on October 9, 1940, and the Court handed down its 
opinion upholding Suttenfield 's contention, on the ground 
that Suttenfield was exempted from the provisions of 
5*'J Section 290, as *falling within the exception contained 
in Section 291, which reads as follows: 
'' The preceding section shall not be construed • * • to 
exclude from such office or post officers, or soldiers on ac-
count of any recompense they may receive from the_ United 
States when called into active duty.'' (Rec., pages 32-33.) 
This opinion of the lower court is made a part of the rec-
ord (Rec., pages 31-37). Pursuant to this opinion, the order 
complained of was entered. 
THE QUESTION INVOLVED. 
The question is whether or not the plaintiff falls within 
any of the exceptions to Section 290 of the Code of Virginia 
set forth in Sections 291, 291a or 291b, so as to take him out 
of the strict provision of Se-0tion 290, which would, ipso facto, 
1·ender his office of Councilman vacant when he was inducted 
into the military service of the United States. 
It is respectfully submitted that he does not fall within 
the exceptions, and tllat Section 290 does apply to him, and 
his office as Councilman of the City of Lynchburg is vacant 
under the facts abov_e set foT'th. 
ARGUMENT. 
Section 290 of the Code of Virginia is as follows : 
"No person shall be capable of holding any office or post 
mentioned in the preceding section, who holds any office or 
post of profit, trust, or emolument, civil or military, legisla-
tive. executive, or judicial. under the government of the 
-Utrlted -States, or who fs in the employment of such govern-
ment or who receives from it in any way any emolu-
ment' whatever; and the accep~ance of any such office, post, 
trust or emolument, or the acceptance of any emolument what-
ever under such government, shall, ipso facto,_ vacate any 
City of Lynchburg, etc., v. J. L. Sutten:field . 5 
office, or post of profit, trust or emolument under the 
6• government of this *Commonwealth or under any county, 
city, or town thereof.'' 
The provisions are explicit. The offices referred to in 
the preceding· section are offices unqer the Constitution of 
Virginia. It was admitted by the plaintiff fn the lower· court-
that the office of ·Councilman is such an office as referr~d to 
in this section. 
There is a real controversy between the parties. The plain~ 
tiff is claiming· a seat in the City Council. The defendants 
deny that right. An official resolution has been adopted by 
the Council declaring plaintiff's seat vacant. 
THE PURPOSE,S OF SECTION 290. 
This section was obviously put iuto the Code of Virginia 
to prevent State offices from being under the domination of 
the Federal Government, and to prevent one person from 
receiving compensation from two governments at the same 
time. This section has been in the Virginia Code in sub-
stantially its present form from at least the Code of 1849. 
The provisions of this section have been upheld in at least 
two cases by this Court. In Bunting· v. Willis, Judge, 68 Va. 
144, Bunting had been a deputy collector and inspector of 
customs for the United States. In May, 1875, he ran for 
7*' the office of *1Sheriff for Elizabeth City County, and was 
elected to take office on ,July 1st. In June· he resigned 
l1iR office with the United States to take effect on June 30th. 
However, no successor having· been appointed to his F·ederal 
poRition. be did on July 1st complete the clearance papers 
of a ship, work on which he had begun prior to June 30th. 
It does not appear that he received any compensation from 
the United States for his work on ,July 1st, ·but the Court 
held that by working for the United States on that day, he 
forfeited the position of Sheriff to which he had been elect~d 
to take office on J ulv 1st. The Court said that his work on 
.T uly 1st as a Federal officer. was in contravention of Sec-
tion 2 of Chapter 11 of the Code of 1873 (now Section 290 
of tl1e Virg-inia Code). 
In Com1nonwea.lth v. l:J,ouse, 163 Va. 841, decided in 1935. this 
Court held that when R-0use who was the dulv elected Com-
monwealth's Attorney for the City of Bristol accepted em-
ployment as counsel for the Home Owners Loan Corporation. 
an agency of the Federal government, such employment. wa~ 
in ~ontravention of :Section 290. The Court. on page 845, 
said: 
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'' In view of the purposes and pro;visions of the Act as 
above noted, we do not think there can be any doubt that 
Rouse 's employment as attorney for the Home Owners Loan 
Corporation, is under the Government of the United States, 
and his acceptance of such employment, and the emoluments 
therefrom, was in cont~.avention of Section 290 of the Code.'' 
It will be not_ed. that the writ of quo warrwnto prayed for 
in the Rouse case was refused by the Court for reasons set 
forth in the opinion, and Rouse was permitted to continue 
to hold his office as Commonwealth's Attorney. 
Sil& * AS TO SECTIONS- 291a AND 291b. 
Although the plaintiff in his petition relied on Section 
291a as exempting him from the provisions of Section 290, 
the lower Court, in its opinion, held that Section 291a did 
not apply. That section provides that members of the naval 
or military reserve and retired officers of the United States 
are not barred from holding office in the States. Obviously 
it referred to such officers while they were in reserve or re-
tired, and not when recalled into active service, and applied 
to such persons who were regular reserve officers, and not to 
members of the National Guard. This certainly could not apply 
to the instant case, as Mr. Sutten:field is not now a reserve 
office1·, but one in active service. 
Section 291b provides that no State officer shall lose his 
position by reason of engaging in war service of the United 
States. That obviously refers only to war service, was en-
acted in 19!18 to meet the needs of the situation at that time, 
and as we are not at war, it is not now applicable. Further-
more. it provides for the appointment of a substitute for an 
officer who is in the war service. 
TI-IE EXCEPTION IN SECTION 291. 
The lower court held tl1at Mr . .Suttcn:field fell within that 
exception of Section 291 of the Code of Virginia, which reads 
as fol1ows: 
'' The nrecedinp: section s11all not be construed * • * to 
exclude from suc11 office or post, officers or soldiers on ac-
~ount of the recompense they may receive when called out 
in actua1 duty." 
In order that there may be no confusion in the minds of 
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this Court as to the contentions of the two parties, they are 
stated as follows : 
9* * (A) Mr. Suttenficld 's position is that so long as he 
is not a member of the ''Regular Army" of the United 
States, he is entitled to retain his office as :Councilman and 
receive the compensation thereof, even though he is now in 
the active military service of the United States as an officer 
in its army receiving the regular salary therefor from the 
United States, and even though he has been called into such 
active service presumably to be absent from the City of 
Lynchburg for at least twelve months. 
(B) Appellants' contention is that so long as l\fr. Suttenfield 
remained a member of the Virginia National Guard, and as 
such National Gu,ard of fleer was called into active duty or 
active service, though he received recom,pense from the United 
States therefor, his City office was not vacated, but when he 
was inducted into the active military service of the United 
State~ under the order of the President issued pursuant to 
resolution of Congress, he lost his standing as a member of 
the Virginia National Guard and, upon his induction, bec.ame 
an active member of the United States Army, and thus does 
not fall within the exception of 1Section 291, and his City 
office was ipso facto vacated by the provisions of Section 
290. 
In arriving at the proper answer to the above questions, 
we must endeavor to ascertain the meaning· of the Virginia 
sect.ion from the language used therein, and the purpose 
which it was intended to serve. In this connection it is also 
necessary to give consideration to the Federal Constitution 
and to the Federal laws with respect to the National Guard. 
THE VIRGINIA LAWS. 
Vir~foia Military Code (Chanter 106 of the Code of 1936) 
provides for the orgm1ization of the Virginia National Guard. 
It com;ists of Section 2673 (1) to Seetion 2673 (108) .dealing 
with the National Guard, the remaining· sections of the 
10* clrnpter dealing· with *nrmories. 
Section 2673 (1) defines the militia as ev~ry male 
from 18 to 45 years of age. (2) Provides that tl1e National 
Gun rd c;;lrn 11 c011sist of the re~:ular enlisted men of the same 
:ure. (3) Provides for the Naval Militia. ( 4) Provides that 
thP nnor1rnnized militia sha 11 consist of everv male not in 
(2) nnd (3). (31) Provides for tl1e training· of the organized 
militia of not less tlian 48 weekly drills and not less tl1an 
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15 days maneuvers in accordance with the Federal regula-
tions. ( 20) Reads in part as follows : 
"'\711enever any portion of the militia shall be called into 
service to execute the law, suppress riot or insurrection, or 
to repel invasion, the articles of war and the aitticles for 
the government of the Navy, g·overning the Army and Navy 
of the United States, and the regulations prescribed by the 
Army and Navy of t}le United States and the regulations is-
sued fµereunder, shall be enforced and regarded as a part 
of this Act until said forces shall be duly relieved from such 
duty." 
Section 2673 (72) provides that the Commander in Chief 
(President of the United States) may at any time "in order 
to execute the law, suppress riots or insurrection, or repel 
inv_asi.on", in addition to calling out the National Guard, 
may call out the remainder of the militia . 
. Article I, Section 8, Clause 16, of the United .States Con-
stitution provides that CongTess shall have power to make 
laws ''to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the 
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel inva-
sions''. The Governor of Virginia shall be the Commander 
of the National Guard when not called into United States serv-
ice (Section 2673 (8) ), and the President shall be the :Com-
mander in Chief when called into the service of the U nitecl 
States (U. S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2). The militia 
as such may be called forth by the President of the 
11 e United States *only for the above three purposes. 
Hoitston v. Moore (U. S.), 5 L. Eel. 19; U. S. v. Su_qar, 
243 Feel. 423, affirmed 252 Fed. 79, certiorari denied 63 J.;. 
Erl. 429. 
THE FEDER~A.L LAWS. 
The lPederal laws with reference to the National Guard are 
contnined in Title 32 of the Federal Code Annotated (Vol. 
11). Section 4 of this Act provides that the National Guard 
of: the respective States shall consist of its regular enlisted 
members. Section 4(a) provides that the National Guard 
of the United .States shall .consist of the federally recog·nized 
uni fa~ of the National Guard of the various States. It con-
fains the nrovision ''that the members of the National Guard 
of tl1e United States shall not be in the active service of the 
United States except when ordered thereto in accordance 
with law", otherwise they are in the service of the State. 
City of Lynchburg, etc., v. J. L. Suttenfield 9 
By Section 81 (a) of Title 32, Fed. Code- Ann., the President 
has.power to call forth the militia as such for the three pur-
poses for which they may be used under the provisions of 
the Constitution above quoted. 
By Section 81 of the same Title, Congress provided for 
the draft of members of the militia under the power given 
it to "raise armies". This can be done only where Congress 
lrn.s declared an emergency. Under this power Congress 
recognizes that it is not calling out the militia as sucli, for 
it is provided '' all persons so ordered into the active mili-
tary service of the United. States shall from the date of such 
order stand relieved from duty in the National Guard of their 
respective States, Territories and the District of Columbia 
so long as they shall remain in the active military servic_e of 
the United States :i= $ *. Upon being relieved from activ~ 
duty in the militiary service of the United States, all 
12* individualR and units *shall thereupon -revert to their 
National Guard status." 
Congress further emphasized distinction between the status 
of an officer of t11c National Guard of the United States and 
the status which exists during active service in the Army of 
the. United States by providing, "Officers _of the National 
Guard of the United .States, while not on active duty, shall not, 
hy reason solely of their appointments, oaths, commissions, 
or status as suc11, or any duties or functions performed, or 
pay or allowances received as such. be held or deemed to be 
offieers or emplovees of tl1e United States, or persons hold-
ing any office of trust or profit, or discharging· any official 
fnnction under or in connection with any department of the 
Oovernment of the United States." Title 32, Section 20, 
Fed. Code Ann. 
lt is adniitted by the vctitioner tha,t he ha.r; been called into 
fl1f rictive 111.ilitary servicP. of the UnHerl States, a.nd that he 
is no lonqer a mem.bPr of th r, Vir,qinia National G1ta·rd, or Na-
tirmn.l Guard of the UnitP.d States (Rec., page 4). 
Sr.rtion 62 of Title 32 Feel. Code Ann. (like Virginia Sec-
tion 267::l (31) m·ovides for 48 Oin'lt'lWl drills and for annual 
mirneuvers of at least 15 clays for tlrn National Guard units. 
A 11 nnv for these services is to be bv the United States. 
With the distinction between services in the National Guard 
of Vindnia a.ml in the active militarv service of the United 
Rfat(l8 e~tah1is11ed, we must consider tl1e meaning of the ex-
c-ention in Section 291 of the Code of Virginia on which the 
petitioner relieR. ._ 
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'From the Code of 1849 down to 1918 this provision· read 
us follows : · 
'' The precedii1g section shall not be construed to exclude 
from such office, wilitia officers or soldiers on account of 
recompense they may receive from the United .States when 
called into actual duty.'' 
rn:f; ,!In 1918 the General Assembly amended it by strik-
ing out the word "militia". Counsel for Mr. Sutten-
field, in his argument before the lower court, correctly stated 
the reason for dropping the word "militia." in the amendment 
of 1918, as follows : 
''The only apparent reason for dropping the word 'militia' 
is that prior to the enactment of the National Defense Act 
on ,Tune 3, ']916, the armed forces of Virginia were called 
'Militia'. After the enactment of the National Defense Act 
on June 3, 1916, the armed forces of this State were termed 
National Guard of Virginia, and the federally recognized 
National Guard of the United States." 
\Ve must consider the particular language of this Virginia 
statute granting the exception to the provisions of Section 
2~0 which ipso facto rendered vacant any State office when 
· a person held an office of trust or profit under the United 
States. Section 291 never said that ''militia officers or 
soldiers" or, (after 1918) ''officers or soldiers" when called 
into actual duty by the United States, were excepted from 
tl1e provisions of Section 290. 
On the contrary, it stated that "militia officers or soldiers" 
and (after 1918) "officers or soldiers" (meaning clearlv of-
. ficcrs or soldiers of the National Guard) should not vacate 
their State office by reason of any "recmnpense they mav re-
ceive from the United States when called out in actual duty.'' 
All through the years, at least from 1849 to date, the Leg-
islature has. kept in mind the proper distinction between 
meml1ers of the National Guard of Virginia and members 
of tl1e United States Army. If it had wanted to say that anv 
meml1er of tl1e Virgfoia l\[ilitia or National Guarcl who wa"'s 
"called into the militarv service of the United States as a 
· pArt of the United Stat'es Army did not thereby vacate his 
office", it would have said so, but it does not say so. It 
savs that no rnemher of the National Guard shall be 
J 4 • barred >!tfrom office by reason of "any recompense" he 
may receive from the United States while on actual 
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duty. This, we insist, could only mean while on duty as a 
member of the N_at-ional Guard. To hold otherwise would 
not give the Legislature credit for the language continued 
in the act since 1849. 
There are three times under the Constitution of the United 
States when the President can call the Militia or National 
Guard of the States into Federal service as National Gu,ard 
meniber . .:; or units, to-wit: to enforce the laws, to suppress 
insurrections, and to repel invasions. Clearly, it was the 
intention of the Legislature to provide that when called out 
on such temporari services as members of the National Guard, 
or while on regular drill or maneuvers, for which they re-
ceived pay from the United States, holders of State offices 
should not lose their title to such offices by reason of any 
recompense received. Such a provision was proper. No 
patriotic Virginian should be penalized for such services. 
But it is respectfully submitted that the situation is entirely 
different when an officer is called into the actual military 
service and beconies a 1neniber of the Anny of the United 
States under the provisions of Section 81, Title 32, Fed. Code 
Ann., which provides as follows: 
''When Congress shall have declared a national emergency, 
and sI1all have authorized the use of armed land forces of 
the United States for any purpose requiring the use of· 
troops in excess of those of the Regular Army, the President 
may. under such regulations, etc. ,M, * * order into the active 
military service of the United States, to serve therein for 
the neriod of war or emergency, unless sooner relieved, any 
or all units and members of the National Guard of the United 
States. Al.I pers011s so ordered into the active military serv-
ice of the United States shall, from the date of such order, 
stand relieved froni duty in the National Gu.a rd of their re-
S1'Jf.cf·ive Sta.tcs, Territories and the District of Ool·wmbia, .c:o 
lon.Q as thev shall renwin in the active 1n-ilitary service of the 
Un:ifed Slates," etc. 
15,llc lll,The decisions hv the va l'ious Federal and State 
CourtR all sunport · tl1e distinction between service in 
the National Guard as such and service in the Army of the 
United States. 
D1·Aftin~!' of members of tl1e National Guard into the serv-
ice of tl1c United States under this section is not drafting the 
Militia as such, since it is nrovidecl that such persons 'shall 
Rt:rnd discliarp;ed from the Militia. U. S. v. 8it_qar, .cmpra. 
~rl1e draft order of the President made pursuant to this 
12 Supreme Court of ..Appeals of Virginia 
Act places membets of the National Guard in the army with-
out further act on their part. Ex parte, Dostal, 243 Fed. 
664. · 
A member of the National Guard on being called into serv-
ice by the President entered the active Federal military serv-
ice. at the latest when he reached the point of rendezvous 
without additional formalities. U. S. v. Carlson, 44 Fed. 
(2d) 5. 
The National Guard does not become a pa.rt of the United 
States Army until Congress declares an emergency calling 
for its services. Baker v. State, 200 N. C. 2.32; 156 S. E. 917. 
Fekefo v. City of Ea.st St. Louis, 350 Ill. 58, 145 N. E. 692, 
40 A. L. R. 650, was the case of a City Attorney who was 
commiRsionecl as Captain in the Illinois National Guard. In 
1917 his regiment was inducted into the military service of 
the United States under the call of the President, and he be-
cnme an officer of the United States Army. He was paid 
hiR salary as City Attorney, and served as such so long as 
he was a member of the National Guard. After his induction 
into the Army of the United States, he, Yeccived no salary as 
City Attorney, and after his discharge in 1919, sued the City 
for his back salary for a.bout eighteen months. The Illinois 
Constitution contained the provision that no person holding 
any office of honor, or profit under the United States 
16,ii should hold any *office of honor or profit under the au-
thority of the State. of Illinois. The Court held that 
after he wa~s inducted into the United States Army, he ceased 
to be a member of the National Guard, and that his office as , 
City Attorney under the provision of the Illinois law became 
vacant upon such induction. The Court concluded with the 
following language: 
'' The question we have to determine is one of law unaf-
fected by sentiment. It seems not open to question that the 
office of Captain in the United States Army is an office of 
honor or profit. If it is, plaintiff, by .his appointment to and 
acceptance of that office, was thereby rendered ineligible to -
hold tl1e office of City Attorney, an office of honor or profit 
under the authority of this ,State. His acceptance of the 
former office was a constructive resignation or abandonment 
of the latter.'' 
In Lmue v. State (Texas), 201 S. V-l. 986, the Court took 
tlle view that a ~Tudge who became an officer in the National 
Huard in 1917. and wag placed on the payroll of the Federal 
Government as an officer in the military service, thereby 
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vacated his office as J udg·e under a Constitutional provision 
that no person holding or exercising any office of profit or 
trust under the United States should be eligible to hold or 
exercise any office of profit or trust under the State. 
The Texas Court conversely held in Ex Parte, Dailey, ,246 
S. vV. 91, 26 A. L. R. 138, that a District Judge who accepts 
a commission of Captain in the Na.tional Guard does not 
thereby vacate his office as Judge, at least so long as the 
Guard is not called into the active rnilitary service of the 
United States. 
That the Federal authorities have always recognized the 
distinction between the service rendered bv members of the 
National Guard a,s such, and the service whei1 they are drafted 
into the National Army, is shown by an opinion of S. T. 
17* Ansell, Acting Judge «•Advocate General of the United. 
States, on October 22, 1917, to the Chief of the Militia 
Bureau of the United .States. A portion of that opinion, 
found on pages 691-69B of the volume published in 1919 by 
the West Publishing Company entitled, '' A Source Book of 
Military Law and War-Time Legislation", prepared by the Vv ar Department ·Committee on Education and Special Train-
ing, is as follows: 
"In this connection the sharp legal and historical distinc-
tion between the National Guard of the several States and 
alter nmnen for the militia of the severa I States, and t.11e 
Army of the United States must be considered and recognized. 
Tl1e militia status of the National Guard obviouslv remains 
in effect up to the point where the individual members there-
of are by draft placed in the Army of t]1e United States. 
'I~herefore, wl1ether the National Guard be not in the serv-
ice of the United States, or whether it be called into the 
service of tlie United States for the com;titutional purpose 
'to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection 01· 
repel invasion', it is still a State force; and its relation to the 
Fecler::il Government is that of a State military force sub-
foct. under the Constitution. to be requisitioned as such for 
limited. Federal purpose~. The National Guard as such never 
berarne federalized. Its members 1Jecame a federal force 1 
only when drafted into the Army of the United States, and 
its officers became officers of the United States onlv when, 
nnon the draft they became appointed officers of the United 
States Army. 
":t The National Defense Act never loses sight of this 
distinction. The Constitutional power of Congress calling 
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the militia into the Federal service is invoked by Section 101 
of the bill wlµch contemplates the call of the ~ational Guard 
as such·; That is, an organized militia for the specified con-
stitutional ·purposes. When in the active service of the 
United States under such call the ·militia serves as the militia 
of the several states. B1d an entirely different constitutional 
power is invoked by Section 111 of the National Defense Act. 
1.'hat section provides for the draft of the 11ie1nbers of the 
militia into the Ar·1ny of the United States for general war 
purposes. There the constitiitional power of Congress to 
rai.c;e and s·upport armies is not as menibers of the National 
Guard or militia nor to serve as m,ilitia, but as members of 
the Anny of the United States. There is, then, no such thing 
as drafting the National Guard into the Federal service as 
such_; only its members as individual citizens arc drcifted. 
The National Guard with its officers, its organizations and 
its organizational relations is not drafted. There is no con-
nection in the eyes of the law between the *status which 
18..... an individual occupies as a member of the National 
Gua1:d, and the status which he occupies after he has 
been drafted into the service of the United States; and there 
is no connection between those two statuses. The service of 
au officer in the former capacity is not service as a commis-
sioned officer of the United States, nor is it service in the 
Army of the United States. The service of an officer in the 
latter capacity is, of course, service as a commissioned of-
ficer in the army of the United States. The National Guard, 
therefore, called, for constitutional purposes, into the service 
of the United States is obviously not a part of the Army. 
This distinction is preserved and sharply recognized in the 
National Defense Act.'' 
A further opinion by General Ansell on the same subject 
appears in 30 Harvard Law R.eview at pages 712-723, entitled 
"Status of State Militia Under the Hay Bill~'. A portion 
of that article appearing on page 723, is as follows: 
'' Coming back to the bill, care should be taken not to con-
fuse the authority to draft the militia as well as all other 
citizens under the power 'to raise and support armies' with 
the power 'to provide for calling forth the militia to execute 
the Jaws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel in-
w1sions '. The latter power is invoked by section 101 of the 
Bill whicl1 cQntcmplates the call of the National Guard as 
such, that is, as organized militia, for the specified constitu-
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tional purposes. ·when in the active service of the United 
States under such a call, the militia serves as militia of the 
several states though subject, of course, for the time being, 
to the exclusive government by Congress. But the power to 
rah;e armies is invoked by section 111, providing for the 
draft of the members of the militia into the Army of the 
United States for war pmposes; in such a. case, they are not 
drafted as militia, nor do they servo as militia, but as mem-
bers of the Army of the United States. Accordingly the sec-
tion expressly declares that' all pei·sons so drafted shall, from 
the date of their draft, stand discharged from the militia.' 
A militiaman, organized or unorganized, is a citizen. Con-
cededly an unorganized, or reserve militiaman is subject to 
draft; otherwise, since all arms-bearing citizens are such 
militia, wl1encc shall our armies come? An org·anized militia..: 
man is no less a citizen and is much better prepared, largely 
at Federal expense, to make effectual contribution to the 
country's cause in time of war." 
19* :i(,It is interesting to note that, since the adoption of 
the resolution of Congress of August 27, 1940, declaring 
an emergency and authorizinp; the President to call into the 
active militarv service of the United States the various unit~ 
of the National Guard in the respective States, the Attor-
neys General of at least four States have rendered opinions 
t]iat the induction of the National Guard members into the 
Annv of the United States vacates the .State office held bv 
the person so inducted, all under State laws similar to t]1os·e 
in Virp:inia. These are Texas, Oklahoma, Illinois and l\finne-
~mt::i. The Texas case, we are advised, is now before the 
Supreme Court of that State, thong·h not yet finally de. 
termined. 
THI~ EFFECT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION ON THE 
CITY OF LYNCHBURG. 
Scdion 5 of the Charter of tl1e City of Lynchburg (Acts 
of .Assernh]y of 1928, page 899, et sr>q., at page 902), pro-
vides: 
"The Council shall consist of ·seven members who sliall he 
elcrforl at larQ."e bv the aualified voters of the 1r.itv. * * * Va-
rmrnies in the Co.uncil sha11 be fi11ecl withil1 thirtv davs for 
the nnexpired term, by a majority vote of the· remaining 
members.'' 
16 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
Mr. Suttenfield has been called into the Army of the United 
8tates and away from the City for a period of at least one · 
year. Presumably that leaves only six Councilmen to act. 
\Vhile it does not appear from the record, another of the 
seven members of the Council is· also an officer in the L.6tb 
H.egiment of the Virginia National Guard, and doubtless he 
will also be called into the active military service in a shot·t 
time, and will be absent from the City for at least twelve 
months. That would leave only five members of the Coun-
cil available for duty. Under the charter provisions, cer-
tain legislation can only be enacted by an affirmative vote of 
five or seven members. If one other member were ab-
20* sent for 'A'any reason, no action could be taken on such 
legislation. Four members of the Council are neces-
sary to constitute a quorum for the transaction of any busi-
nesR. ·while it does not exist at the present time, it might 
'have happened that four or even all of the members of the 
Council of the City of Lynchburg might have been in the 
National Guard, and thereby called into active service of the 
United States. In either case, if all of those members held 
on to their office, they would be receiving pay from the City 
though unable to perform any of their duties as Councilmen, 
and also pay from the United States, and the City of Lynch-
burQ: would be without any governing body able to act. 
'11he above would be the result if the holding of the lower 
court be sustained. If it be not sustained, then the remain-
ing members of the Council can elect a successor to Mr. Sut-
tenfield to fill his unexpired term, and if other vacanies oc-
curred from time to time, the remaininp: memb.ers of the 
Council could then fill those vacanies, so that the Council of 
tl1e City would at all times be a duly organized a~d function-
ing body. There is no provision of law in this case (as pro-
vided in Section 291 (b) in war time) for the election or ap-
pointment of substitutes for the period of service of Mr. 
Suttenfield in the United States Armv. 
W11ate-ver may be our desire not to penalize City officers 
who are rendering their patriotic duty to the Nation, we must 
recognize that in a national emergency we all may be called 
upon to make sacrifices, and as stated by the Illinois court in 
the Fekete case, "The question we have to determine is one 
of law, unaffected by sentiment.'' 
l 
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21,'i '!i=CONCLUSION. 
The decision of the lower court should be reversed because, 
for reasons hereiubefore stated: · 
(1) Section 290 of the Virg·inia Code renders vacant any 
State or City oflice when the holder thereof accepts any 
position in the military service of the United States. 
(2) Mr. Suttenfield is not within the exception contained 
in Section 291, because tl1at exception relates only and ex-
cepts only officers and soldiers who are on active duty as mem-
bers of the National Guard of Virginia as such, though receiv-
ing pay for such services from the United States, and does not 
apply to members of the Army of the United States even 
though they were inducted therein because of their former 
~tatus as members of the National Guard of Virginia. 
IMPORTANCE OF REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT 
OF APPEALS. 
This question involved is new so far a.s Virginia is con-
cerned. No other similar situation has arisen in Virginia 
or come before the Virginia courts. We are not at·war. The 
National Guard has not been called out to perform National 
Guard duties. It has been, or will be inducted into the Army 
of the United States. Not only will tl1e City of Lynchburg 
lrnve two of its Councilmen affected by the ~ituation, but 
doubtleRs other cities, towns and counties may be affected 
nncler the same circumstances. Indeed, the State itself, will 
probably have some of its officers inducted into the United 
States Army under the same resolution of Congress. There 
· now exists an uncertainty until the question is passed on by 
this court as to whether or not legislation which might 
22'"' be adopted by tlie Council * of the City of Lynchburg· 
would be valid legislation because of some question as 
to proper composition of the Council. The present emer-
gency may not extend for only one year, but for two or three 
years conceivably, and anv action taken by the Council of the 
Citv migl1t be questioned. It is desirable once and for all 
that this question ,be settled not only for the benefit of the 
City of Lynchburg·, but for all of the g·overnmental bodies in 
the State. 
It is respectfully requested that if the writ of error be 
granted the case· be placed upon the privileg·ed docket before 
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this honorable court in order that the question involved may 
be decided at the earliest possible moment. This is important 
in order that all the governmental agencies affected may be 
in a position to take action to meet the situation if the ruling 
of the lower court. is reversed. 
J\fr. Suttenfiekt was inducted into the United States Army 
on September· 16, 1940. The lower court held on, October 14, 
1940, that his office as Councilman was not vacated. That is 
the law until reversed. As it is obvious that this court can-
not pass upon this question until after thirty days from Sep-
tember 16, 1940, it is respectfully submitted that .Mr. 8utten-
field will rightfully be a member of the Council of the City 
of Lynchburg until this court holds otherwise, and that this 
court, in case it reverses the order of the lower court, s110ulcl 
in its opinion hold that the remaining members of the Coun-
cil of the City of Lynchburg shall have the right and duty 
to, within thirty days after the decision by this court, elect 
Mr. Suttenfield 's successor. 
A copy of this petition, which is to be taken as the open-
ing brief of petitioners, was delivered to Thomas J. Williams, 
Counsel for Mr. Sutten:field and for Edley Craig·hill, 
23~ on the 31st day ''of October, 1940. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG, L. E. LICH-
FORD, COUNCILMAN AND :MAYOR 
OF SAID CITY, W. M. HEALD, C. G. 
PATTERSON, R. A. CARRINGTON, 
JR., AND A. P. LANKFORD, MEM-
BERS OF THE COUNCIL OF SAID 
CITY, 
By T. G. HOBBS, 
ROBERT D. MORRISON, 
Attorneys for Petitioners. 
I. '11. G. Hobbs, the undersigned counsel, practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify 
that in my opinion the ruling· of the order of the Corpora-
tion Court for the City of Lynchburg in the above mentioned 
case is erroneous, and the said orcle1~ should be reviewed ancl 
reversed. 
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Given under my hand tbis 31st day of October, 1940. · 
T. G. HOBBS. 
Received Nov. 1, 1940. 
1\1. B. WATT·S, Clerk. 
Writ of error ancl, superscdeas awarded. No bond. 
11/7/40. 
H. B. G. 
Received Nov. 8, 1940. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Aubrey E. Strode, judge of 
the corporation court for the city of Lynchb_urg·, at the 
court house thereof, on the 14th day of October, .A. D., 
1940, and in the 165th year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, on the 4th day of 
October. 1940, at a corporation court for tl1e city of Lynch-
burg, came John L. 8uttenfield by Thomas J. Williams, Es-
quire, bis attorney, and filed in open court his petition ask-
ing for a declaratory judgment against the City of Lynchburg, 
and L. E. Lichf ord, Councilman and ·Mayor of said City, 
W. M. Heald, C. G. Patterson, Edley Craig·hill, R . .A. Car-
ringfon, Jr., ancl A. P. Lankford, members of the Council 
of said City; and came also the said defendants, City of 
Lyncl1hurg, and L. E. Lichford. Councilman and Mayor of 
said City, W. 1\f. Heald, C. G. Patterson, R. A. Carringtpn, ' 
.Jr., and A. P. Lankford, members of the Council of said City, 
by T. G. Hobbs. City Attorncv, and filed in open court their 
answers to said petition; and came also Edley Craighill, a 
member of the Council of said City, by Thomas ,J. Williams, 
his attorney, and filed his answer to said petition: Said pe-
tition and answers and other incidents of trial are in the 
words and figures following, to-wit: 
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page 2 ~ To the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, a municipal 
corporation, and L. E. Lichford, Councilman and 
Mayor of the said City, W. M. Heald, C. G. Patterson, Ed-
ley Craighill, R. A. Carrington, Jr., and A. P. Lankford, 
members of the Council of the said City: 
Take Notice: That on Friday, the 4th day of October, 
1940, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, the un-
dersigned John L. Suttenfield will petition the Corporation 
Court for the City of Lynchburg, at the Court House thereof, 
for a declaratory judgment to determine his rights as a Coun-
cilman of said City, and to determine w·hether or not his 
office as Councilman of said City was made vacant by reason 
of his ·being inducted into the military service of the "United 
State8 on September 16, 1940, under the facts and circum-
stances hereinafter set forth, over which there exists an actual 
controversy between the nndersig·ned on the one side and the 
City of Lynchburg and the members of the Council of said 
Citv on the other side. 
This notice shall constitute the petition before said Court, 
and in support thereof petitioner states further as follows: 
(1) Petitioner ,1rns elected at the regular municipal elec-
tion held on the first Tuesday of August, 1940, to the office 
of Councilman of the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, to serve 
for a term of four years beginning as of September 1, 1940, 
:md he duly qualified as sucl1 Councilman on September 2, 
1940. and has acted as such Councilman from thence until 
his office as sue-h Councilman was declared vacated by formal 
action of the Council of said City, at a regular meeting· of 
said City Council held on September 20, 1940, as hereinafter 
set forth. 
(2) The other members of the Council of the City of Lynch-
burg are L. E. Lichford, who has been chosen as 
page 3 ~ President of tl10 Council, and as such, Mayor of the 
_ City, vV. 1\L Heald, C. G. Patterson, Edley Craig-
hill. R. A. Carrington, Jr.. and A. P. Lankford. 
(3) On the 17th day of l\fay, 1938, there was issued to pe-
tittoner by the Governor of the .State of Virginia, effectiye as 
of April 15. 1938, a commission as First Lieutenant-Chaplain 
in the Vinrinia National Guard. a Federally recognized unit 
of the National Guard of the United ,States, and your peti-
tioner there11pon clul:v qnalifiecl as such officer~ since which 
time youl' pet.itio11cr has held. and now holds~ tlie offiee of 
:Firgt Licutemrnt-C;hanhlin in the 246th Coast Artillery (Har-
bor Defense) of the National Guard of Virg'inia. By an or-
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der dated April 30, 1938, the Secretary of vVar of the United 
States extended to petitioner }.,ederal -recognition ''in the 
National Guard of Virginia as Chaplain-First Lieutenant, 
246th Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense)", to date from April 
15, 1938. 
( 4) Under authority of a joint resolution of the Congress 
of the United States, approved August 27, 1940., a copy of 
which is filed herewith as Exhibit No. 1, and as such asked 
to be read as a part of this petition, the President of the 
United States on August 31, 1940, ordered certa,in units and 
members of the National Guard of the United States into 
the active military service of the United iStates for a period 
of twelve consecutive months commencing· September 16, 
1940. Included in this call was the unit of the 246th -Coast 
Artillery (H. D.) of the Virginia National Guard in which 
this petitioner is an officer as hereinbefore set forth. A copy 
of said order of tl1e President of the United States is here-
with filed marked Exhibit No. 2., and as such is 
page 4 ~ prayed to be read as a part of this petition. Pur-
suant to this call, the Governor of Virginia, acting 
by the Adjutant-General of the Virginia National Guard., is-
sued an order calling- all units a.nd personnel of the 246th 
Coast Artillery (H. D.) of the Virgfoia National Guard, in-
cluding petitioner, to report for duty and to be inducted 
into the military service of the United States on ,September 
16, 1940. A copy of this order received by petitioner is filed 
herewith as Exhibit No. 3, and as such asked to be read as 
a part of this petition. Pursuant to said order and call peti-
tioner reported for duty on September 16, 1940, and was 
thereupon duly inducted into, and is now engaged in, actual 
military service and duty of the United States pursuant to 
law. 
( 5) At a reg·ular meeting of the Council of the City of 
Lynchburg held on the 20th day of September, 1940, peti- , 
tioner presented himself at the Council Chamber in the 
Mm1icipal Building of said City for the purpose of attending 
snid meeting· and acting· as a member of tlic Council of said 
City. At said meeting- there was presented to the Council 
m1 opinion by flrn City Attorney to the effect that, under the 
provisions of Section 290 of the Code of Virginia, when peti-
tioner was inducted into the militarv service of the United 
States. ]1is office as Councilman of ~the City of Lynchburg 
ipso facto became vacant. ·whereupon, and over the protest 
of petitioner, the Council of the Citv of Lynchburg, by a 
vote of five ayes and one nay, YOlff 1Jetitioner not voting, and 
Edley Craighill, another member of the Council of the City 
22 Supreme Court· of Appeals of Virginia 
of Lynchburg, voting nay, adopted a resolution declaring 
the office of your petitioner, as Councilman, vacant. 
page 5 ~ A copy of this resolution is filed herewith as Ex-
hibit No. 4, and as such asked to be read as a part 
of this petition. 
(6) Your petitioner is advised and charges that he is ag-
grieved by the aforesaid action of the Council of the City 
of Lynchburg; that his induction into the military service 
of the United States as hereinbefore set forth did not ipso 
facto vacate his office as Councilman of said City; that he is 
still a member of the Council of the City of Lynchburg, and 
as such is entitled to all of the rights and privileges of that 
office and to the benefits thereof. · 
(7) Your petitioner is advised and charges that the afore-
said action of tl1e City Council was based upon an opinion 
of the City Attorney of Lynchburg to the effect that, under 
the facts and circumstances above set forth, when petitioner 
was inducted into the military service of the United States 
on Septem'ber 16, j1940, his office as Councilman of the City 
of Lynchburg ipso facto became vacant, because of the pro-
visions of Section 290 of the Code of Virginia, and that the 
provisions of Section 291 of said Code did not and do not 
operate to exclude petitioner from the effect of the provi-
sion~ of said Section 290. Petitioner is advised · and avers 
that if the provisions of Section 290 of the Code of Virg·inia 
became applicable to him when he was inducted into the mili-
tary service of the United States as aforesaid, then under 
the facts and· circumstances hereinbefore set forth he is ex~ 
pressly excepted from such provisions by the terms of Sec-
tion 291 of the Code of Virginia, and petitioner comes within 
the exception of said Section 291 which provides 
page 6 ~ that Section 290 of the Code '' shall not be construed 
Al: * * to exclude from such office or post officers or 
soldiers on account of any recompense they may receive from 
tl1e United States when called out in actual duty". 
(8) Petitioner is furt11er advised and charges that, as a 
matte1· of law, and while holding his commission as First 
Lieutenant in the National Guard of Virginia, which com-
mif.,sion petitioner avers he still holds, he is a member of the 
United States Military Reserve. Force, and by the express 
terms of Section 291-a of the Code ·of Virg·inia his induction 
into tlle military service of the United States, under the facts 
fl11Cl circumstances hercinbefore set forth~ did not disqualify 
him from holding- Iiis office as Councilman of the City of 
Lynchburg·, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 290 of 
· the Code of Virginia. 
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(9) A ·real controversy exists between the petitioner and 
the City of Lynchburg, a municipal corporation, and between 
petitioner and five other1 members of the Council of the City 
of Lynchburg, to-wit: W. M. Heald, L. E. Lichford, C. G. 
Patterson, R. A. Carrington, Jr. and 4-. P. Lankford, said 
five named members of said Council having voted for the 
adoption of the aforesaid resolution on September 20, 1940~ 
(10) Petitioner is advised and charges that it is very ipi-
portant for him, for the City of Lynchburg·, and for the Mayor 
and Councilmen of the City of Lynchburg, tha.t his present 
status as Councilman of the· said City, by reason of the fore-
going facts and circull!stances, be determined and passed upon 
by the Courts at the earliest possible moment, and 
page 7 ~ that all actions of the City Council of Lynchburg 
on and after September 16, 1940, will be subject to 
question and attack unless and until there has been_ a binding 
adjudication as to the rights of petitioner in the premises. 
,vherefore, petitioner, John L. Suttenfield, by authority 
of and in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 254-A . 
of the Code of Virginia, as amended, will petition the Cor-
poration Court of the City of Lynchburg at the time and place 
aforesaid, presenting this as his petition, for a declaratory 
judgment determining his rights as Councilman of the City 
of Lynchburg, and whether or not his office as such Council-
man was vacated by his induction into the military service 
of the United States as aforesaid. 
JOHN L. SUTTENFIELD, 
By THOS. .J. WILLIAMS, 
Counsel. 
EXHIBIT #1. 
(Public Resolution-No. 96-76th Congress) 
(Chapter 689-3d Session)· 
(.S . .T. Res. 286) 
l oint Resolution 
To strengthen the common defense and to authorize the 
President to order members and units of reserve components 
and retired personnel of the Regular Army into active mili-
tary service. 
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Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That 
during the period ending June 30, 1'942, the President be, 
and is hereby, authorized fro:rµ time to time to order into 
the actiYe military service of the United States for a period 
of twelve consecutive months each, any or all members and 
units of any or all reserve ~omponents of_ the. Army of the 
United S_tates (except that any person in the National Guard 
of the United States under the age of 18 years so ordered 
into the active military s·ervice shall .beJmmediately 
page 8 ~ i$su~d al) honorabl~ di$cha.rg·~: -fI!Om the National 
-Guard of the. United States), and retired personnel 
of the ReguJ;ir_A~my., with_ or without their consent, to such 
extent and in such manner as he may deem necessary for the 
streng·thening of the national defense: Provided, That the 
memberA and units of the reserve components of the Army 
of the United States ordered into active Federal service un-
der this authority slmll not be employed beyond the limits of 
the ·western Hemisphere except. in the territories and pos-
Ressions of the United States, including· the Philippin~ Is-
. lands. 
Sec. 2. All National Guard, Reserve, and reti~~d personnel 
ordered into the active military service of the United 1Sta.tes 
under tli<? foregoing special aut11ority, shall from the dates 
on which they a,re respectively required by such order to re-
port for duty in such service, be subject. to the respective 
]Rws and regulations relating to en1istments, reenlistments, 
emplovment, conduct, ri!rhts, and privileges, and discharge 
of such personnel in such service to t.he same extent in all 
particulars as if they ha.d ·l)een ordered into such service un-
der existing- a·enera 1 statutorv authorizations. 
Sec. 3. (a) Any member of anv reserve component of the 
land or naval forces who is on active duty or who mav be as-
sfa:necl to active duty, aml who. in the judgment of those in 
authority over him, satisfactorilv completes such active duty. 
and anv person so ordered into the active militar-~r service of 
the United States wl10. in the :iudg·ment of t.110se in authority 
over llim. sathifactorilv romnletes the neriod of service re-
<1uired nndPr this joint resolution. sba 11 be entitled to a cer-
tificate to that eff P.ct nnon tlie comnletion of sucb 
page 9 ~ active duty or ~urh period of service. which shall 
· include n recowl of anv s-pecial proficiencv 01· merit 
atfainerl. In adcliti011. each ~mch pe1·son w110 ii:; assi~ed to 
snch ftctivP duhT 01· orclP.red into ~uch nct.ive milihnv- service 
shall be given a pl1ysical examination at the beginning of 
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such active duty or service and a medical statement showing 
any physical defects noted upon such examination; and upon 
the completion of the period of such active duty or service, 
each such person shall be given another physical examina-
tion and shall be given a medical statement showing any in-
juries, illnesses or disabilities suffered by him during such 
period of active duty or service. , 
(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to per-
form such active duty or such service, has left or leaves a 
position, other than a temporary positio;n, in the employ of 
any employer and wh9 (11) receives such certificate, (2) is 
still qualified to perform the duties of such position, and (3) 
makes application for reemployment within forty days after 
. he is relieved from such active duty or service-
(A) if such position was in the employ of the United 
States Government, its Territories or possessions, or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, such person shall- be restored to such posi-
tion or to· a position of like seniority, status and pay; 
(B) if such position was in the employ of a private em-
ployer, such employer shall r~tore· such ·person to such posi-
tion or to a position of like seniority, status and pay unless 
the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it 
impossible" or unreasonable to do so; · _ . 
. ( C) if _such position was in the employ of any 
pAge 10 ~ State or political subdivision thereof it is hereby 
declared to be the sense of the Congress that such 
person ·should be restored to such position or to a position 
of like seniority, status and pay. 
( c) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance 
with the provisions of paragrl!,phs (A) .or (B) of subsection 
(b) shall be so restored without loss of seniority, insurance 
participation or benefits, or other benefits, and such person 
shall not be discharged from such position without cau~e 
within one year after such restoration; · 
( d) In case any private employer.fails. or refuses to com-
ply with the provisions of subsectio11 (b) or subsection (c), 
the district court of the·Uni'ted States fo'r the district in which 
such private employer maintains a place of business shall 
have power, upon the filing of a motion, petition, or other 
appropriate pleading by the person entitled to the benefits 
of such provisions, to specifically require such employer to 
comply with such provisions. The court shall order a spt~edy 
hearing in any sucl1 case and shall advance it on the calemlar. 
Upon application to the United States district attornev for· 
the district in w'hich such private employer maintains a 
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place of business, by any person claiming to be entitled to the 
benefits of such provisions, such United States district at-
torney, if reasonably satisfied that the person so applying is 
entitled to such benefits, shall appear and act as attorney for 
such person in the amicable adjustment of the claim or in 
the filing of any motion, petition or other appropriate plead-
' ing and the prosecution thereof to specifically re-
page 11 ~ quire such employer to comply with such pro-
visions: Provided, That no fees or court costs 
shall be taxed against the person so applying for such bene-
fits. 
(e) Any member of any reserve component of the Army of 
the United States below the rank of captain who is order.eel 
into the active military service of the United States pursnnnt 
to this joint resolution, who has any person or persons de-
pendent solely upon him for support, and who has no other 
means of support except the wages, salary or other compen-
sation for personal services that he earns, may resign or shall 
he discharged upon his own request made within twenty days 
of the date of his entry into such active military service. 
Sec. 4. (a) The benefits of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil 
Relief .A.ct, approved March 8, 1918, are hereby extended to 
all National Guard, Reserve, and retired personnel ordered 
into the active military service under authority of this joint 
resolution, so long as such personnel are in such service and 
for sixty days thereafter, and except as hereinafter provided, 
the provisions of such Act shall be effective for such pur-
poses. 
(b) For the purposes of this section-
(1) The following provisions of such Act of March 8, Hl18, 
shall be inoperative: Section 100; and paragraphs (1), (2), 
and (5) of section 101; article 4, article 5; paragraph (2) of 
section 601 ; and section 603. 
(2) the term "persons in military service", when used in 
such .A.ct, shall be deemed to mean persons ordered into the 
active military service under the authority of this joint reso-
lution. 
(3) the term "period of military service", wh()n 
page 12 ~ used in such Act, when applicable with respect to 
any person, shall be deemed to mean the period 
beginning with the date on which such person is ordered into 
such active military service and ending with tl1e date on wl1ich 
}1e is relieved from such service. 
Sec. 5. All laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are 
hereby suspended to the extent that they may be in conflict 
with an~· provision hereof. 
Approved, August 27, 1940. 
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EXHIBIT #2 · 
Executive Order 
Ordering certain units and members of the National Guard 
of the United States into the active Military Service of the 
United States. 
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by Public 
Resolution No. 96, 76th Oongress, approved August 27, 1940, 
and the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as amended 
(39 Stat. 166), and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, I hereby order into the active 
military service of the United States, effective September 16, 
1940, the following units and members of the National Guard 
of the United States to serve in the active military service of 
the United States for a period of twelve consecutive months, 
unless sooner relieved: 
UNITS 
All active elements of: 
44th Division, less 44th Tank Company 
30th Division, less 30th Tank Company 
45th Division, less 45th Tank Company 
41st Division, less 41st Tank Company 
197th Coast Artillery (Anti-aircraft) 
198th Coast. Artillery (Anti-aircraft) 
202nd Coast' Artillery (Anti-aircraft) 
203rd Coast Artillery (Anti-aircraft) 
page 13 ~ 211th Coast Artillery (Anti-aircraft) 
213th Coast Artillery (Anti-aircraft) 
251st Coast Artillery (Anti-ai?rcraft) 
244th Coast Artillery ( 155mm Gun) 
25oth Coast Artillery ( 155mm Gun) 
252nd Coast Artillery (155mm Gun) 
240th Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) 
241st Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) 
242nd Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) 
. \ 
I 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
243rd Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) 
245th Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) 
246th Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) 
248th Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) 
249th Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) 
105th Observation Squadron 
119th Observation Squadron 
154th Observation Squadron 
116th Observation Squadron 
MEMBERS. 
All members, both active and inactive, of the units listed 
above. 
All persons so ordered into the active military service 
' of the United States are, from the effective date of this order, 
relieved from duty in the National Guard of their respec-
tive States so long as they shall remain in the active mili-
tary service of the United States, and during such time shall 
be subject to such laws and regulations for the government 
of the Army of the United States as may be applicable to 
members of the Army whose permanent retention in the 
active military service is not contemplated by law. 
Commissioned officers and warrant officers appointed· in 
the National Guard of the United States and commissioned 
or holding warrants in the Army of the United States, and 
affe~ted by this order, are hereby ordered to active duty 
under such appointments and commissions or warrants. 
All officers and warrant officers of the National 
page 14 ~ Guard appointed in the _National Guard, federally 
recognized or examined and found qualified for 
Federal recognition, and assigned to units ordered to .active 
duty under this order prior to the effective date hereof, who 
do not hold appointments in the National Guard of the United 
States and commissions or ,varrants in the Army of the United 
States, are hereby tendered such appointments in the same 
grade and arm or service which they respectively hold in 
the National Guard. 
Warrant officers and enlisted men of the National Guard 
who hold appointments as officers in the National Guard of 
the United States and commissions in the Army of the United 
States, and are assigned to units ordered to active duty under 
this order prior to the effective date hereof, are hereby or-
dered to actiYc military service as commissioned officers of 
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the Army of. the United States under those appointments 
and commissions. 
The White House 
August 31, 1940. 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. 
(No. 8530.) 
EXHIBIT #3. 
Copy Commonwealth of Virginia 
The Adjutant General's Office 
Richmond 
General Orders} 
No.16 
1. The Honorable Secretary of War, by telegram Septem-
ber 3, 1940~ directs that under authority of Public Resolution 
Number ninety-six, seventy-sixth Congress, approved August 
27, 1940, and Executive Order of the President of the United 
States Number 8530, August 31, 1940, all units of the 246th 
Coast Artillery (HD), Virginia National Guard 
page 15 r and all personnel both active and inactive are or-
dered into the active military service of the United 
States effective September 16, 1940. 
2. All personnel of the· 246th Coast Artillery (HD) both 
active and inactive will report to their respective armories 
at 9 :00 A. M.- on Monday, September 16, 1940, preparatory 
_ to being inducted into the Federal Service by order of the 
President. This induction will be in strict compliance with 
provisions of A. R. 130-10. 
. 3. To effectively and promptly accomplish the orders of 
the Governor of Virginia and the Secretary of War, careful 
adherence to A. R. 130-10 dated :March 27, 1940, is ordered. 
By order of the Governor: 
s/S. GARDNER WALLER 
S. GARDNER "WALLER 
Brigadier General· · 
The Adjutant General· 
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EXHIBIT #4. 
Whereas, John L. Suttenfield, a member of the Council of 
the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, duly elected as suc.h, has 
been an officer in the Virginia National Guard; and 
Whereas, the said John L. Suttenfield was inducted into 
the military service of the United States on September 16, 
1940, under a resolution of Congress approved August 27, 
1940, and is now an officer in the United States military 
service ; and 
Whereas, the City Attorney for the City of Lynchburg has 
rendered an opinion that, under the provisions of Section 290 
of the Code of Virginia, the office of said John L. Sutten:field, 
as Councilman of the City of Lynchburg, became 
page 16 ~ vacant upon his induction into said military service 
of the United States; 
Now, therefore, be it resolved That tl1e Council of the 
City of Lynchburg does hereby declare a vacancy in the 
Council of said City occasioned by the induction of the said 
John L. Sutten:field into the military service of the United 
States, and that the said John L. Sutten:field is no longer 
a member of this Council. 
Adopted. September 20th, 1940. 
L. E. LICHFORD, Mayor. 
A Copy, Teste : 
JNO. M. OTEY, 
Clerk of Council. 
page 17 ~ ANSWER. 
In the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg, 
Virginia. 
The joint answer of the defendant, the City of Lynchburg, 
a municipal corporation, and L. E. Lichf ord, Councilman and 
Mayor of said City, and of the defendants, W. l\L Heald, 
C. G. Patterson, R. A. Carrington, Jr., and A.. P. Lankford, 
Councilmen of said City, to a motion and petition of the plain-
tiff, John L. Suttenfield, for a declaratory judgment against 
these def en clan ts, and against Edley Craighill, a not.her Coun-
cilman of the said City. 
These defendants acknowledge service of the said notice 
and petition, and waive the legal notice and service thereof. 
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·These defendants come and answer said petition as fol-
- lows: 
(1). The defendant, the City of Lynchburg, is a municipal 
corporation under the laws of the State of Virginia. Its char-
ter provides that it shall have a Council of seven members, 
one of whom shall be elected by the Council from its own 
body to be President, and as such Mayor of the City. The 
defendants, L. E. Lichford, vV. M. Heald, C. G. Patterson, 
R. A. Carrington, Jr., A. P. Lankford and one Edley Craig-
hill, another defendant in said petition, are Councilmen of 
the City of Lynchburg duly elected and qualified as such, 
and the said L. E. Lichford has been duly chosen by the 
, Council as President thereof, and as such Mayor of the City. 
(2). These defendants admit the allegations of Clause (1) 
of the petition. 
These defendants admit the allegations of Clause (2) of 
the petition. · 
These defendants admit the allegations of Clause (3) of 
the ·petition. 
These defendants admit the allegations of Clause ( 4) of the 
petition; but aver, as a matter of law, that since 
page 18 ~ petitioner's induction into the military service of 
the United States on September 16, 1940, he is no 
longer a member of the Virginia National Guard, but an 
o·fficer in the United States Army. 
These defendants admit the allegations of Clause (5) of 
the petition. · 
(3). These defendants deny the claim of the petitioner set 
forth in Clause (6) of the petition, that he is still a member 
of the Council of the City of Lynchburg, and they are advised · 
and charge that under the terms of Section 290 of the Code 
of 1Virginia, the office of the said J olm L. Suttenfield as 
Councilman of the City of Lynchburg·, ivso fact'o, became 
vacant upon his induction into the military service of the 
United States as set forth in the petition, and that the said 
Suttenfield, by operation of law, is no longer a member of 
the Council, and no longer entitled to participate in the meet-
ings of said Council or to receive any of the benefits of the 
said office, and that the resolution of the Council, filed as 
Exhibit 4 with the petition, declaring the vacancy, was merely 
declaratory of the existing legal status. 
( 4). These defendants are further advised and charge that 
the petitioner does not fall within any of the exceptions to 
the express terms of Section 290, as set forth in Sections 
291, 291a and 291b of the Code of Virginia. 
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Section 291 of the Code provides in part, in so far as here 
pertinent: 
'' The preceding section shall not be construed *' * * to ex-
clude from such office or post officers or soldiers on account 
of any recompense they may receive from the United States 
when called out in actual duty.'' 
page 19 ~ Respondents are advised and charge that the 
above quoted provision of Section 291 is the only 
exception under which the petitioner claims, or can claim, 
that his office as Councilman of the City of Lynchburg is not 
vacated, and respondents are advised and charge that pe-
titioner does not come within said exception. 
Section 291a of the Code of Virginia excepts from the 
operations of Section 290 only members of the United States 
military or naval reserves, or retired officers of the United 
States Army, and respondents are advised and charge that 
petitioner does not fall within these exceptions. 
Section 291b of the Code excepts only municipal officers 
when engaged in war service of the United States, and re-
spondents are advised and charge that as the United States is 
not now at war, petitioner does not fall within this exception. 
( 5). These defendants admit that there is a real contro-
versy between the petitioner and the defendants and each of 
them. At a meeting of the Council of the City of Lynchburg 
held on September 20, 1940, after adopting the resolution 
· filed as Exhibit 4 with the petition, the Council adopted 
another resolution by a 5 to 1 vote, Edley Craighill voting 
in the negative, declaring the controversy to exist, and au-
, · thorizing the filing of this a_nswer. Copy of this resolution 
is filed as Exhibit A with this answer, and as such asked 
to be read as a part hereof. The decision on the question 
raised by the petition is a matter of ,rital importance to the 
City. It is important to have established the question of 
whether or not the said John L. Suttenfield is a member of 
the Council, so that if it be held that his office is vacant for 
the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the remaining 
page 20 ~ members of the Council may, under the provisions 
of the charter of the City of Lynchburg, elect a 
successor to fill the vacancy so that the Council may be con-
stituted as providec"\ by said charter; and if it be held that 
said office is not vacant, the Council can then proceed to 
transact business in due form without danger of having its 
acts attacked as illegal because of a Council not constituted 
as required by the charter. 
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These respondents unite in the prayer of the petition that 
the Court pass upon the question of whether or not the office 
of Councilman, to which the said John L .. Snttenfield was 
elected, becam~ vacant because of his induction into the mili-
tary service of the United States ~s set forth in the petition, 
but they ask the Court to declare said office vacant for the 
reasons above set forth. 
And having· fully answered, they pray, etc. 
THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG, 
a municipal corporation, 
L. E. LICHFORD, . . 
Councilman and Mayor of the City of Lynchburg, 
W. M. HEALD, 
C. G. PATTERSON, 
R. A. CARRINGTON, JR., and 
A. P. LANKFORD, 
Councilmen of the City of Lynchburg. 
By T. G. HOBBS, City Attorney. 
Whereas, at a meeting of the Council of the City of Lynch-
burg, Virginia, held on this 20th da.y of September, 1940, there 
was presented to the Council an opinion of the City Attorney 
holding that John L. Suttenfield, a duly elected member of 
said CQuncil, had ceased to be a member of said Council by 
reason of the fact that as officer in the Virginia National 
Guard, he had been inducted into the military service of the 
United States, and that such induction into the military serv-
ice of the United Stat.es had vacated his office as 
page 21 ~ such Councilman under the provision of Section 
290 of the Code of Virginia; and . 
Whereas, ~t this meeting, the Council of the City of Lynch-· 
burg adopted by a vote of 5 Ayes and 1 Nays, a resolution 
declaring .that the office of the said J olm L. Suttenfield as 
such Councilman was vacated for the foregoing reason, which 
action :of the Council ·was protested by the said Suttenfield, 
wlio declared that his right to said office was not affected by 
his induction into the· military service of the United States, 
and that he intended to apply to the Corporation Court for 
the City of Lynchburg to have determined the question as 
to whether or not his office as Councilman of the City was 
vacated by his induction into the military service of the 
United States; and 
Whereas, it is a matter of great importanc.e to the City 
of Lynchburg that the question of whether or not the said 
John L. Suttenfield is still a member of the Council of the 
City, be passed upon and determined by the Court, and that 
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a real controversy with reference thereto exists between the 
said John L. Suttenfield and the City of Lynchburg; 
Now, The1:"efore, be it Resolved by the Council of the City 
of Lynchburg/Virginia, the said J olm L. Suttcnfield not vot-
ing, that in case the said John L. Sutten:ficld should institute 
proceedings before the Corporation Court for the City of 
Lynchburg to have determined the question of whether or not 
he is still a councilman of the City of Lynchburg, the City 
Attorney of the City of Lynchburg· be authorized and directed 
to def end said proceeding in the name of the Council of 
the City of Lynchburg, and the individual members thereof, 
or of the City of Lynchburg, as a municipality, as he may be 
advised, and to do everything possible to secure a 
page 22 } final determination of said question by the Court 
at the earliest possible moment, and if the Cor-
poration Court sustain the position of said John L. Sut-
tenfield, the City Attorney is authorized and directed to ap-
peal said proceeding to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia. 
Adopted. September 20th, 1940. 
L. E. LICHFORD, Mayor. 
A Copy, Teste: 
JNO. M. OTEY, Clerk of Council. 
page 23 } ANSWER OF EDLEY CRAIGHILL. 
The separate answer of Edley Cra.ighill to a petition filed 
in the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg, Va., 
on October 4, 1940, by John L. Sutten:field against the City 
of Lynchburg and the members of the Council of said City, 
praying for a declaratory judgment determining the rights 
of said John L. Suttenfield as a Councilman of the City of 
Lynchburg. 
For answer to said petition, or to so much thereof as this 
respondent is advised it is necessary he should answer, this 
respondent answers and says: 
That he is now and has been a regularly elected and duly 
qualified member of the Council of the City of Lynchburg, 
Virginia, since September 1, 1934; that as a member of said 
City Council, he attended the meeting of said Council held on 
September 20, 1940, at the Council Charnl1er in the Municipal 
Building of the City of Lynchburg, and that at said meeting 
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he voted against the adoption of a resolution presented at 
said meeting declaring the office of John L. Suttenfield, as 
Councilman, vacant, because of his induction on September 
16, 1940, into the military service of the United States, under 
die circumstances set forth in the petition of said John L. 
Suttenfield; and that your petitioner voted against the adop-
tion of said resolution for the reason that he is advised and 
believes that the induction on September 16, 1940, of said 
John L. Suttenfield into the military service of the United 
States, under the circumstances set forth in said petition, did 
not operate to vacate the office of said John L. Suttenfield 
as a Councilman of the City of Lynchburg. 
Your petitioner is advised and believes that the matters 
set forth in the aforesaid petition are true, and 
page 24 ~ he therefore unites in the prayer of .said petition, 
and hereby waives not.ice of the filing of said pe-
tition. 
THOS. J. WILLIAMS, 
Counsel. 
~DLEY CRAIGHILL. 
page 25 r STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
It is agreed by and between counsel for the petitioner John 
L. Suttenfield, and counsel for the City of Lynchburg and 
for L. E. Lichford, Councilman and Mayor of said City, 
and for W. M. Heald, C. G. Patterson, R. A. Carrington, Jr., 
and A. P. Lankford, Councilmen of said City, and by coun-
sel for Edley Craighill,, Councilman, that this case shall be 
heard on the petition of J olm L. S'uttenfield and the exhibits 
thereto attached, and on the joint answer of the City of Lynch-
burg, L. E. Lichford, Councilman and :Mayor, and of W. ::M 
Heald, C. G. Patterson, R. A. Carring1:on, Jr., and A. P. 
Lankford, Councilmen of said City, and exhibit thereto at-
tached, and on the separate answer of Edley Craighill, Coun-
cilman of said City, and on the following agreed state of 
facts; and tlrnt all a.l]egations of facts set forth in the petition 
and not denied in the ans,Jt1er shall be admitted as proven; 
and that all allegations of fact contained in the answer and 
not denied shall be admitted as proven. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
(1). During the four years next preceding September 1, 
1940, John L. Suttenfield was a duly elected, qualified and 
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acting Councilman of the City of Lynchburg, and received 
as compensation for his services as such the sum of $500.00 
per annum paid by the City in equal monthly instalments; 
and that tor his term of office beginning September 1, 1940, 
he would receive compensation at the same rate. 
(2). Pursuant to National Guard regulations, the members 
of the 246th Coast Artillery (H. D.) Virginia National Guard 
have each year held weekly drills in the 1iumber 
page 26 r prescribed at the respective armories of the several 
units comprising said 246th Coast Artillery (H. D.) 
Virginia National Guard. These weekly drills are held pur-
sµant to National Guard regulations fixing the time and place 
for such drills by order of the Secretary of War through 
military channels. The officers and soldiers participating in 
said weekly drills receive compensation therefor from the 
United States Government, known as Armory Drill Pay. No 
order or call is issued by any authority for each separate 
drill, but the 48 drills each year prescribed by National Guard 
regulations are fixed in advance as to time and place by 
appropriate instructions emanating from the office of the Sec-
retary of War. 
Pursuant to National Guard regulations, issued under au-
thority of tlie National Defense Act of 1920, as amended,· 
each Federally recognized unit of the National Guard of Vir-
ginia is required to participate in annual field training. The 
time, place and routine details relating to its annual field 
training are fixed by the National Guard Bureau by authority 
of the Secretary of War. .Authorization to the Federally 
recognized units of the National Guard of Virginia for such 
annual field training is issued by the Adjutant General of 
Virginia, acting for the Governor of 'Virginia. Annual field 
training has been engaged in by all Federally recognized units 
of the National Guard of Virginia., including the 246th Coast 
Artillery Regiment, and the members of such units partici-
pating in said annual field training receive compensation there-
for from the United States Government. The general form 
of the order directing such annual field training is as fol-
lows: 
'' Commonwealth of Virginia 
The Adjutant General's Office 
page 27 r General Orders} 
· No.14 Richmond, July 19, 1940. 
1. {a) Pursuant to Training Authority NGB 64-1, July 16, 
1940, and in accordance with the provisions of Administrative 
-= 
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Memorandum No. 19, July 1, 1940, Headquarters, Director 
1st Army Maneuvers, and Training Memorandum No. 2, Head-
quarters 29th Division, July 16, 1940, the State Staff and 
State Detachment (less detachments) and those organizations 
of the Virginia National Guard which are part of the 29th 
Division, will hold their annual field training by participating 
in the First Army Maneuvers in the vicinity of Rensselaer 
Falls, New York. 
(b) Units will move by rail and motor in accordance with 
Annex 1 and .Annex 2 to this order, these having been pre-
pared, respectively, by Trunk Line Association and Head-
quarters Third Corps Area. 
• • ~ &c., &c. 
By Order of the Governor: 
S. GARDNER WALLER, 
S. GARDNER WALLER, 
Brigadier General, 
The Adjutant General.'' 
While the terms of the above mentioned order apply to all 
units of the Virginia National-Guard except the 246th Coast 
Artillery, yet the same general form of order is issued an-
nually pursuant to the same authority covering the animal 
field training of the 246th Coast Artillery Regiment of the 
Virginia National Guard. 
The petitioner, John L. Sutten:field, since holding his com-
mission as First Lieutenant Chaplain in the 246th Coast 
Artillery Regiment of the Virginia National Guard 
page 28 ~ has regularly participated in the weekly drills and 
the annual field training of the 246th Coast_ Artil-
lery Regiment, as required by the aforesaid authority, and 
receiv:ed compensation therefor from the United States Gov-
ernment. 
THOS. J. "WILLIAMS, 
Counsel for John L. Sutten:field, 
Petitioner, 
T. G. HOBBS, 
Counsel for City of Lynchburg, 
L. E. Lichf ord, W. M. Heald, 
R. A. Carrington, Jr., C. G. 
Patterson, A. P. Lankford, 
Councilmen. 
THOS. J. WILLIAMS, 
Counsel for Edley Craighill. 
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page 29 ~ At this day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation 
Court, October 4th, 1940. 
This day came J olm L. Suttenfield, by counsel, in open 
court, and presented his notice and petition with exhibits 
thereto attached, asking for a declaratory judgment against 
the defendants, the City of Lynchburg·, and L. E. Lichford, 
Councilman and Mayor of said City, W. M. Heald, C. G. 
Patterson, Edley Craighill, R. A. Carrington, .Jr., and A. P. 
Lankford, members of the Council of said City, with respect 
to a controversy between petitioner and the said defendants 
as to whether or not the said John L. Suttenfield be a mem-
ber of the Council of the City of Lynchburg, and on motion, 
said notice and petition is ordered filed. 
And likewise c.ame the City of Lynchburg and L. E. Lich-
ford, Councilman and Mayor of said City, and W. lVL Heald, 
C. G. Patterson, R. A. Carrington, Jr., and A. P. Lankford, 
members of the Council of the said City, by counsel, and ask 
leave to :file their joint answer to the said notice and petition, 
which answer waives legal notice and service of said notice 
and petition of petitioner, and which answer concurs in the 
statement of the petition that an actual controversy exists 
between the petitioner and the said defendants, and asks for 
a decision by the court on the questions in controversy, and 
on motion, said answer with exhibit thereto attached is oi·-
dered filed. 
And likewise came Edley Craighill, a member of the Coun-
cil of the City of Lynchburg, by counsel, and asked leave to 
file his separate answer to the said notice and petition, which 
answer likewise waives notice and service of the said notice 
and petition of the petitioner, and which answer 
page 30 ~ also asks the court to pass upon the questions in 
controversy raised in the petition, and on motion 
said answer is ordered filed. 
And it appearing to the court from the said petition and 
answers that there is an actual controversy between the pe-
titioner. and the defendants as to the questions raised in said 
petition and answers, and that the parties, plaintiff and de-
fendants, are entitled to a declaratory judgment thereon, and 
the case having been fully mattued by the filing of the notice 
and petition and of the answers by all defendants thereto, 
counsel for all parties consenting thereto, this cause is or-
dered placea upon the docket of this court, and set for hear-
ing on the petition and exhibits therewith filed, and on the 
answers and exhibits thermvi.th filed, and on an agreed state-
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ment of facts, agreed to by counsel for all parties, which 
statement is ordered filed as a part of the record in this case, 
at 9 A. M., on the 9th day of October, 1940. 
At another day, to-wit: At Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
October 9th, 1940. -
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and the argu-
ment of counsel being heard, and the court not being ad-
vised of its judgment to be given in the premises, takes time 
to consider thereof. 
page 31} 
John L. Suttenfield, Petitioner, 
v. 
October 10, 1940. 
City of Lynchburg and others, Defendants. 
OPINION. 
Messrs. T. Gibson Hobbs, and 
T. J. Williams, 
City. 
Gentlemen:-
This proceeding seeks a declaratory judgment upon the 
question whether petitioner, being a First Lieutenant Chap-
lain in the National Guard of ,Virginia, by responding to the 
call of the President of the United States to service with 
his command thereby ipso facto vacated petitioner's member-
ship in the Council of the City of Lynchburg, a majority of the 
Council having undertaken so to declare over the protest of 
petitioner. 
Su:fficient facts appear in the record to support the juris-
diction of the Court to award the declaratory judgment 
prayed for. 
At common law acceptance by an official of another and in-
compatible office vacates his prior office. 
In Virginia, however, the subject is regulated by statute 
in respect of the matter here involved. 
There being no federal question in issue, the power of 
the General Assembly of .Virginia in the premises is plenary. 
Against the petitioner Virginia Code Section 290 is pleaded. 
That section provides : 
"No person shall be ca.pable of holding any office or post 
mentioned in the preceding section, who holds any office or 
Supreme Court of .A.ppeals of . Virginia 
post of profit, trust, or emolument, civil or mili-
page 32 ~ tary, legislative, executive, or judicial, under the 
government of the United States, or who is in the . 
employment of such government, or who receives from it ' 
in any way any emolument whatever; and the acceptance 
of any such office, post, trust or emolument, or the acceptance 
vf any emolument whatever under such government, shall, 
ipso facto vacate any office, or post of profit, trust or emolu-
ment under the government of this Commonwealth or under 
any county, city or town thereof.'' 
'' The preceding section'' referred to disqualifies persons 
for being concerned in a duel "to hold any office of honor, 
profit, or trust, under the Constitution of Virginia''. 
Assuming that by the terms of the said Section 290 pe-
, titioner's membership in the Council would be terminated, it 
remains to determine whether he is relieved from such for-
feiture by any of the statutory exceptions contained in Sec-
tions 291, 291a. and 291b of the Code of Virginia. 
Petitioner not being a member of the Officers' Reserve 
Corps or a "reHred" officer, S'ection 291a has no application, 
and likewise the United States not being at war Section 291b, 
having application only to municipal officers in "war service" 
may be eliminated from present consideration. 
The narrowed question then is, does petitioner come within 
any of the· numerous exceptions to the operation of Section 
290 set out in Section 291 t 
If Section 291 be pertinent, exception here to Section 290 
must be found. in the following provision of Section 291: 
'' The preceding section shall not be construed • * * to ex-
clude from such o'ffice or post officers or soldiers 
page 33 ~ on account of any recompense they may receive 
from the United States when called oi1t in actual 
duty." 
Petitioner being beyond dispute such "officer", and having 
responded to an order of the · Governor of Vir6rinia made 
pursuant to an order of the President of the United States 
under Public Resolution No. 96, 76th Congress, app1·oved 
. August 27, 1940, authorizing the President "to order into 
the active military service of the United States" unit~ of the 
National Guard, petitioner is to be held such ''officer'' so 
'' called out'' as is referred to in Virginia Code Section 291. 
The precise question thus left for determination is: Is 
petitioner "in actual duty" within the legislative meaning 
and intendment of said clause of Code Section 291 Y 
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Considering as we must the interrelation of the National 
Guard with the Federal Army, the State statutes upon the 
subject must be construed in connection with the Federal 
statutes in pari materia. 
So construing the State statutes no difficulty is found in 
:finding that "actual duty" appearing in them is synonymous 
with '' active service'' used in the Federal enactments, and 
that "recompense" in Virginia Code Section 291 is to be 
taken as denoting the "pay and allowances" provided by the 
Federal statutes for National Guard officers while in the 
active service of the United States. 
Thus also '' called out'' appearing in the one is to be held 
the same as ''order(ed) into" appearing· in the other. 
The true intent and meaning of said Code Section 291,_ 
so far as applicable here, then is to be found in the following 
language: 
page 34 ~ Section 290 shall not be construed to exclude 
petitioner, National Guard officer John L. Sutten-
field, from his o'ffice as a member of· the Council of the City 
of Lynchburg on account of the recompense in pay and allow-
ances he may receive under federal laws by reason of hi~ 
having been called out in actual duty under .}awful orders into 
the active service of the United States. 
This interpretation does no violence to the words used in 
Section 291, to the benefit of which petitioner is entitled. - . 
The legislative history of the Virginia Code sections re-
ferred to is helpfully confirmatory of the conclusions indi-
cated. 
The present Code Section 290 appeared in the Virginia 
Code of 1849, a.nd is found in the same language as Section 
163 in the Code of 1887. 
The clause in issue here of the present C~de Section 291 
as quoted above, is found in Section 164 of the Code of 1887; 
except that in said Section 164 the word "militia" appears 
before the words "officers or soldiers''. This omission of the 
word "militia" was made by amendment in 1918, when the 
State forces were a part of the United States Army engaged 
in the World War and was obviously intended to make clear 
that being thus in the United States Army did not vacate 
State offices that Virg'inia National Guard officers and sol--
diers might be holding. 
The term ''militia'' appears in the supreme law o~ the land, 
the Constitution of the United Stat~s, more tha.n once. In ~ 
Article II, Sec. 2, it is provided : '' The President shall be 
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the commander in chief of the Army and Navy of 
page 35 ~- the United States, and of the militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual service of the 
United States.'' Attention is directed to the use of the words 
''actual'' and ''called'' now found also in Virginia Code 
Section 291. · 
Also in Article I, Section 8 of the Federal Constitution, 
defining the powers of Congress, is found clause 16 provid-
ing: "To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, 
the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be 
employed in the service of the United States, reserving· to the 
States respectively the appointment of the officers and the au-
thority of training the militia according to the discipline pre-
scribed by Congress.'' 
It will be further noted that within the last past quarter 
of a century amendments and additions to Code Section 291 
. have been enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia at 
some fifteen separate sessions, every single one of which 
amendments and exceptions to the rule of disqualification laid 
down in said Section 290, showing the liberalizing tendency 
of the legislative mind in respect of the matter under con-
sideration. 
That the clause of Section 291 immediately in issue has 
not been further changed indicates the legislative intention 
to leave in effect the broad terms '' officers and soldiers" as: 
comprehending all members of the National Guard State 
.forces when taken into the Federal service. 
By the enactment of Section 291a in 1920, and its amend-
ment in 1926, exception was extended to members of the 
National organized reserve forces and to retired officers of 
the army, navy or marine corps. 
Such special enactment was thought necessary 
page 36 ~ it may be because those belonging to these classes 
were not necessarily members of the State forces 
but as parts of the regular Federal military forces were not 
embraced under the terms '' officers and soldiers'' employed 
in Section 291. 
The contention of defendants that ''recompense'' as used in 
the statute should be held to apply only to ·Federal funds re-
ceived while in weekly or annual training, or while employed 
under Federal calls that do not require induction into the 
artny of the United States, does not appear to be we~l founded. 
No such limitation is set out in Section 291. 
The legislative history of the enactments under review 
read in the light of conditions· existing at the periods of their 
adoption indicates a clear intention on the part of the General 
.Assembly to disqualify for holding offices under the State 
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members of the regular army of the United States, perma.-
nently in the army without special call and to except from 
such disqualification '' officers and soldiers'' of the State forces 
when called into service of the United States, presumptively 
temporary in its nature. Thus 1Virginia frees her citizens 
patriotically to respond to the Nation's calls to service with-
out having to pay a penalty of forfeiture in respect of an offic~ 
under the State. 
Upon the whole case petitioner is entitled to a declaratory . 
judgment finding void the City Council's attempted exclusion 
of him and directing that the said City Council and such 
of its members as a.re parties defendant to this suit shall 
recognize and admit petitioner as a member of said Council 
with all the duties, rights and privileges appertaining there-
to, none of which shall be further denied him be-
page 37 } cause of anything appearing in this record. 
Counsel may concert and present for entry a form 
of order in accordance with the conclusions hereinabove set 
out. · 
Very truly yours, 
AES/A AUBREY E. STRODE, Judge. 
page 38 } And now at this day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Cor-
poration Court, October 14th, 1940, the date first 
hereinbef ore mentioned. 
This cause came on to be heard on the petition of Jqhn 
L. Suttenfi.eld asking for a declaratory judgment against the 
defendants, the City of Lynchburg, and the said L. E. Lich-
f ord, Councilman and Mayor of said City, and W. :M. Heald, 
C. G. Patterson, Edley Craighill, R. A. Carrington, Jr., and 
A. P. Lankford, members of the said City, to determine 
whether or not the office of the said John L. Suttenfield as 
Councilman of the City of Lynchburg was vacated when he, 
· as an o·fficer of the Virginia National Guard, was inducted 
into the military service of the United States on September 
16, 1940, under a resolution of Congress approved .A.ugust 
27, 1940, and the executive order of the President of the 
United States issued August 31, 1940, pursuant to said reso-
lution of Congress, and on the exhibits filed with said petition, 
and on the joint answer of tl1e City of Lynchburg and of 
L. E. Lichf ord, Councilman and Mayor of said City~ and 
of W. M. Heald, C. G. Patterson, R. A. Carrington, Jr., and 
A. P. Lankford, members of the Council of the said City and 
the exhibit therewith :fifed, and on the separate answer of 
' 
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Edley Craighill, a member of the Council of said City, and on 
an agreed statement of facts, all filed by leave of Court, 
, and on argument of counsel in open court on October 9, 1940; 
and the Court, taking time to consider its opinion in the mat-
ter, doth Adjudge and Order, for reasons set forth in its 
written opinion herewith ordered made a part of the record 
in this case, as follows: 
That the induction of the petitioner into the military service 
of the United States under the said resolution of 
page 39 ~ Congress of August 27, 1940, and the said execu-
tive order of the President of the United States 
issued pursuant thereto, filed as exhibits· with the petition, 
did not vacate the office of the petitioner as Councilman of 
the City of Lynchburg, and that the resolution adopted by 
the Council of the said City on September 20, 1940, and filed 
as Exhibit No. 4 with the petition in this cause. is void and of 
no effect, and that the said petitioner is still a member of 
the Council of the City of Lynchburg·, Virginia, and as such 
entitled to all of the rights, powers, duties and benefits of said 
office, and that the Mayor and other members of the Council of 
the City of Lynchburg shall recognize said petitioner as a 
member of said Council, just as though he had not been in-
ducted into the military service of the United States a.s afore-
said; to which ruling of the Court tile City of Lynchburg and 
L. E. Lichford, member of the Council of gaid City and Mayor 
thereof, and W. l\L Heald, C. G. Patterson, R. A. Carrington, 
Jr., and A. P. Lankford, members of the Council of the said 
City, by counsel, excepted on the grounds that the said ruling· 
was contrary to law. 
page 40 ~ I, Hubert H. :Martin, Clerk of the corporation 
. court for the city of Lynchburg, do certify that 
the foregoing is a true transcript of the record of the case 
of J olm L. Suttenfield v. City of Lynchburg, et als., and I fur-
ther certify that the notice required by Section 6339 of the 
Code was duly given, as appears by a paper writing filed with 
the record of said case. 
The fee for making this transcript is $10.00. 
Given under my hand this 16th day of October, 1940. 
HUBERT I-I. MARTIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. vV ATTS, C. C. 
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